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Articulating Trade-Offs:
The Political Economy of State Action Immunity
Hillary Greene*
I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust uses economic analysis to assess various trade-offs involving
efficiency.' Even assuming that a competition matter implicates purely
economic matters it can be exceedingly difficult to determine and measure all
the relevant factors, assign them proper weights, decide on the appropriate time
frames, assess the pertinent interactions, and conduct the trade-off calculations.
Not surprisingly, different members of the antitrust community often take
vastly differing positions regarding the economic consequences of a particular
antitrust doctrine as well as the significance of those consequences. When
potentially anticompetitive conduct occurs in the context of state regulation,
the challenge to achieving a sensible accommodation is heightened because
substantially less agreement exists regarding the appropriate balance between
federalism and federal competition policy. Moreover, given that constitutional
considerations arguably inform the balance struck, the necessity of achieving
the correct balance is even more significant.
One feature of the state action immunity doctrine around which
controversy has swirled, a feature with profound practical as well as symbolic
importance, is the requirement that the state clearly articulate its intention to
displace competition. The central legal issue is federalism; it is not whether
federal competition policy would achieve superior outcomes versus a state
regulatory scheme. This essay briefly comments on the current debate
regarding the "clear articulation" requirement.2 I first explain the basics of this
requirement through synthesizing several key characteristics that the Supreme
Court has expressly accepted or rejected as potential hallmarks of state activity
warranting antitrust immunity. My presentation underscores a key trade-off
regarding clarity of state intent that figures prominently in the Supreme Court's
*Associate Professor, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. J.D. Yale Law
School, B.A. Yale College. Antitrust, the S.J. Quinney College of Law, and the University of
Utah are three institutions to which Professor John J. Flynn has contributed enormously. As
John's colleague, I too have benefited greatly. Particular thanks to James D. Hurwitz, Manuel A.
Utset, and Mark Winerman for valuable input. The views expressed are those of the author.
'See, e.g., Hillary Greene, The Role of the Competition Community in the Patent Law
Discourse, 69 ANTrIUST L.J. 841 (2001) (discussing the role of antitrust in illuminating
consumer
welfare trade-offs that patents may impose).
2
The state action doctrine's "active supervision" requirement, see infra notes 8-9 and
accompanying text, falls beyond the scope of this Comment. The clear articulation requirement
is applicable in all state action immunity cases, whereas the active supervision requirement is
implicated in only those cases involving allegedly anticompetitive conduct by private actors
rather than government entities.
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legal standard. I then present several features characterizing the dominant
criticism of that standard. This criticism ostensibly focuses on the judiciary's
imprecise delineation of its own "clear articulation" requirement. Yet the
criticism also seems to reflect dissatisfaction with the underlying value the
Supreme Court accorded federalism in its formulation of the state action
immunity doctrine. In particular, many antitrust critics advocating restriction of
the availability of such immunity seem to employ, albeit oftentimes implicitly,
an economic-efficiency based trade-off. Many of the state action doctrine's
critics frequently seem reluctant to grapple openly with reassessing the value
of federalism in this context. This is particularly unfortunate given the
significant competition values at issue. Multiple trade-offs are pertinent to the
state action immunity debate; this Comment seeks to illuminate them with the
hope that by clarifying costs and benefits-even if they are ultimately
unquantifiable or incommensurate-social discourse will have been enriched.3
II. UNDERSTANDING STATE ACTION IMMUNITY'S
"CLEAR ARTICULATION" REQUIREMENT

State action immunity is a judicially created doctrine originating in the
4 Parker broadly
Supreme Court's ruling in Parker v. Brown (Parker).
articulated the need to subordinate national competition policy, as embodied in
the Sherman Act, to a state's right to assert regulatory autonomy in areas that
the federal government had not preempted through antitrust or otherwise.5 The
principle animating Parkerwas and remains clear: federalism.
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress.
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
action directed by a state ....
3

This essay is based on my comments regarding Professor Darren Bush's symposium
presentation and his subsequently revised working paper, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions
and Immunities as Applied to Regulated Industries. See Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust
Exemptions and Immunities as Applied to Regulated Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 761.
Professor Bush's symposium contribution relies heavily upon a Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) staff report. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, FTC, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK
FORCE (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf [hereinafter
FTC STAFF REPORT]. Because of Bush's reliance and the prominence of the FTC in the current
state action immunity debate more generally, this Comment also addresses several arguments the
FTC and/or its staff have advanced.
4317 U.S. 341 (1943).
5
See id. at 350-52, 358, 367-68 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2, 7, 15 (2000)).
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There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the
Act's legislative history.6
While Parker established the general rationale underlying state action
immunity, California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn v. Midcal Aluminum Inc.
(Midcal) established a two-part test for determining when state action
immunity will shield potentially anticompetitive conduct. 7 "First, the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by
the State itself.",8 The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the second prong,
active supervision, applies only to private actors and not to municipalities and
other government entities. 9
A. ClearArticulation Defined
Since Midcal, the Supreme Court has issued several rulings elaborating
upon its "clear articulation" requirement. Two key rulings issued during the
1985 term precluded certain narrow interpretations of "clear articulation."
In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States
(Southern Motor Carriers), the Department of Justice (DOJ) instituted a
Sherman Act section 1 lawsuit alleging price fixing against two rate bureaus
composed of motor common carriers.' 0 The rate bureaus contended that the
state action doctrine immunized them because they had participated in
collective ratemaking activity that the Mississippi State Commission had
"actively encourag[ed]."11 Notwithstanding such "encouragement," the
legislature had not "describe[d] the implementation of its policy in detail...
"I12
, The Court refined its "clear articulation" requirement in negative terms.
Namely, the Court identified two factors it would not require prior to finding
immunity. With regard to the lack of specificity and detail characterizing the
legislative authorization in question, the Court ruled that such precision was
unnecessary "[a]s long as the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace
competition in a particular field with a regulatory structure."' 13 With regard to
the fact that the statute had not compelled the private parties' activities at issue,
the Court ruled that if "the State clearly articulates its intent to adopt a
permissive policy" state action immunity might still obtain.14

6

ld. at 351.
U.S. 97 (1980).
1d. at 105 (citation omitted).
9
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34,46-47 (1985).
0471 U.S. 48, 48 (1985).
87445

"Id.
at 64.
2

1d. at 64-65.
at 64.
at 60 (emphasis added).

3
41d.
1 1d.
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Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire (Hallie) was issued concurrently
with Southern Motor Carriersand further buttressed its central holdings. 5 In
Hallie, the Court reiterated that compulsion was not a prerequisite to finding
that an entity acted pursuant to a "clearly articulated state policy," mere
"authorization" of a given practice could be sufficient.' 6 Nor, the Court held,
was it necessary that an official pronouncement include an "express intent to
displace the antitrust laws."'' 7 Instead, the issue was whether the "statute
provided regulatory structure that inherently 'displace[d] unfettered business
freedom."" 8
The Court, demanding neither an "express intent ''9 nor a "specific,21
detailed [plan] , 2' introduced "foreseeability" as an alternative standard.
Anticompetitive conduct was foreseeable and, therefore, potentially
immunized when it "logically would result from [a] broad [grant of]
authority." 22 In Hallie, the state authorized the city to provide sewage services
that included the ability to determine which areas to serve. In light of the city's
"broad authority to regulate," the Court ruled that "it [was] clear that
anticompetitive effects logically would result." 23 Foreseeability has become the
centerpiece of much current criticism of state action immunity.
B. Clearly Articulated Trade-Offs
Successful application of the Supreme Court's state action precedent
requires more than merely understanding the precise terminology selected
("foreseeable result ' 2 4) or rejected ("specific, detailed, legislative
authorization" 25). It requires understanding the underlying trade-offs embodied
in these rulings. A central trade-off underlying the Court's state action
immunity standard pertains to the balancing of false negatives (erroneous
rejections of immunity) and false positives (erroneous findings of immunity).
When federalism is involved the Supreme Court has consistently placed a
higher priority on protecting against false negatives than it has on preventing
false positives. The Court repeatedly has recognized various practical realities
that contribute to less-than-explicit statements of legislative intent. More
importantly, the Court's method for determining legislative intent involves a
15471 U.S. 34 (1985).
6

1d. at 42, 45.

171d. at 42 (citing New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978)).

'8See id. (quoting Fox, 439 U.S. at 109) (concluding that statutes "clearly contemplate"
that the city may engage in anticompetitive conduct because anticompetitive conduct was a
"foreseeable result" of the statutes).
9

1 1d.

(citing Fox, 439 U.S. at 109).

2°l. at 39 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978)).
21
1d. at 42.
221d.

231d.
24

1d.
25

1d. at 39.
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"clarity trade-off' between the benefit of clarity regarding state legislative
intent and the cost of requiring such clarity. The cost of clarity manifests itself
indirectly through reduced state regulatory prerogatives. This section
highlights the clarity trade-off within Supreme Court precedent, a trade-off that
Part III argues many state action immunity critics fail to appreciate adequately.
Southern Motor Carriers balanced the need for certainty about the
legislature's "intent to displace competition" against a possible burden that
would make it "difficult [for states] to implement through regulatory agencies
their anticompetitive policies. 26 The Court observed rather dramatically, that
"[riequiring express authorization for every action that an agency might find
necessary to effectuate state policy would diminish, if not destroy, [the state
agency's] usefulness. 1127
Hallie further illuminated the clarity trade-off between the federal
government's ability to effect antitrust policy and the ability of states to
effectuate anticompetitive regulatory policies. The Court stated the notion that
one could impose a strict articulation requirement on the states reflected "an
unrealistic view of how legislatures work and of how statutes are written. No
legislature can be expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute
of this kind."2 8 Moreover, "requiring such explicit authorization by the State
might have deleterious and unnecessary consequences . . . [including]
local autonomy and authority to
detrimental side effects
29 upon municipalities'
themselves.,
govern
In addition to recognizing the potential costs to federalism resulting from
excessive articulation requirements, Hallie also recognized the corresponding
judicial burden of such a requirement.
Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent
to determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be
undesirable also because it would embroil the federal courts in the
unnecessary interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the
courts, it would undercut the fundamental policy of Parker and the
state action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust
scrutiny. 30
The state action immunity case law regarding "clear articulation" is about
navigating uncertainty regarding a state's intent to control-and therefore
immunize-an aspect of its commercial life. It is not about the wisdom of any
26S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64 (1985).
27

Id. (citing Hallie,471 U.S. at 44).

28Hallie, 471 U.S. at 43.

29Id. at 44 (citing City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 434-35
(1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
3Id. at 44 n.7 (citing I PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW I
212.3(b) (Supp. 1982)).

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2006:827

anticompetitive regulation per se. If, for example, a state enacted an
anticompetitive regulatory regime that clearly pandered to narrow private
interests and satisfied the Midcal requirements, state action immunity would
obtain. Social scrutiny of such legislative conduct and the resulting statute
would fall to regimes other than antitrust (with responses covering a wide
range of possibilities including, for example, possible bribery actions). 3' As
Professor Hovenkamp explained, the Supreme Court's process-oriented test
reflects the fact that the purpose of state action immunity "is not to protect
federal regulatory or competition goals, but to give appropriate recognition to
state regulatory power ....[W]hen a court applies the state action doctrine it
must try to avoid making substantive judgments about whether the state
regulation at issue is a good idea. 32
III. CLARIFYING THE CRITICISM OF "CLEAR ARTICULATION"
The key to understanding much antitrust criticism of the state action
immunity doctrine lies in the extent critics have, or have not, adequately
recognized the clarity trade-off that Part II highlighted. I argue that the critics
have frequently failed to grapple adequately with that trade-off. I speculate that
the critics' stance on the clarity trade-off reflects a more fundamental
disagreement with the value the Supreme Court accorded federalism when
determining how to assess state action immunity. Though the critics have not
framed their inquiry in this manner, it is worth considering the extent to which
their approach to the state action immunity doctrine includes consideration of
the doctrine's effect on overall social welfare. More specifically, to what extent
do the critics' state action assessments include an "economic efficiency tradeoff" that balances economic efficiency with the value accorded federalism?
My comments address the current debate regarding state action immunity
and focus primarily on the criticisms and reforms suggested in the 2003 Report
of the State Action Task Force (FTC Staff Report).33 The FTC staff's efforts
have been vital in framing the current debate and arguably capture much of the
34
overall tenor of the current antitrust criticism of the state action doctrine.
State action immunity, both its functioning and its reform, continues to garner
substantial attention owing, in large part, to the Antitrust Modernization
31

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise,2004 COLUM. Bus. L.

REV. 335,348.
32

1d. at 347. In the decades since Southern Motor Carriers, the Supreme Court has
continued to recognize a similarly limited role for judicial review of state action. City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 377 (1991) ("Parker was not written in
ignorance of the reality that determination of 'the public interest' in the manifold areas of
government regulation entails not merely economic and mathematical analysis but value
judgment, and it was not meant to shift that judgment from elected officials to judges and
juries.").
33
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 25-59.
34
See supra note 3 (explaining the scope of this essay).
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Commission's inclusion of this issue on its agenda.35 I also discuss other
important strands of the debate advocated by Professor Darren Bush.36
Throughout this Comment, my reference to the "critics" is primarily to the
positions held by the FTC and/or Professor Bush.
A. InterpretingJudicial Interpretationsof Trade-Offs
Part II briefly discussed two key Supreme Court rulings. Unfortunately,
the current debate (and particularly prominent reform advocates) fails to
adequately address precisely those portions of the Supreme Court's rulings that
are most critical. Consideration of the value judgments underlying these
rulings, as expressed through the clarity trade-off, is essential to their proper
application. Moreover, given the extent to which many critics have
characterized their position as more faithful to Supreme Court rulings than the
positions of those with which they disagree, the critics' treatment of key
precedent warrants particular scrutiny.
Among the most intriguing aspects of the current criticism of state action
immunity is its relatively measured nature. While critics routinely decry many
lower court decisions as shielding anticompetitive conduct to an extent
unwarranted by federalism principles, they also suggest that fidelity to existing
Supreme Court precedent could largely remedy such perceived
misinterpretations. Thus, the FTC Staff Report "recoimend[ed] clarification
and re-affirmation of the original purposes of the state action doctrine.
Similarly, the American Antitrust Institute ("AAI") observed that "issues have
arisen with lower court implementation of the doctrine that have thwarted38the
Court.
main goal of the state action doctrine" as articulated by the Supreme
35

The Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 11051Stat.'1856 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 note), created the Antitrust Modernization
116
60,
Commission (AMC) with the charge of examining "whether the need exists to modernize the
antitrust laws and to identify and study related issues," id. § 11053(1). After soliciting public
input, the Antitrust Modernization Commission adopted the issue, "Should the state action
doctrine be clarified or otherwise changed?" for study. Memorandum from the Immunities and
Exemptions Study Group to the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (May 6, 2005), available at
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/ImmunitiesExemptionsStudyPan.pdf.
36
See generally Bush, supra note 3.
37
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. In a written submission to the AMC, the
American Bar Association ("ABA") noted with ostensible approval that "[s]ome commentators
have criticized the decisions in the lower courts for interpreting the State Action doctrine to
exempt conduct that does not meet the Midcal criteria." Comments from the Section of Antitrust
Law of the Am. Bar Ass'n to the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n 14 (Sept. 30, 2004),
The ABA, therefore,
available at http://www.amc.gov/comments/abaantitrustsec.pdf.
recommended the AMC study whether "any clarification of the [state action] doctrine" is
warranted. Id. The ABA then noted that the 2003 FTC Staff Report would be of "considerable
if the AMC elected to pursue this issue. Id.
assistance"
38
Comments from the Am. Antitrust Inst. Working Group on Immunities and Exemptions
to the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n 6 (July 15, 2005), available at http://www.
antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/433.pdf.
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My review of the critics' primary writings revealed virtually no
substantive treatment or reference to the clarity trade-off contained in the
Supreme Court cases discussed previously. 39 Rather, the critics support their
apparent desire to restrict the availability of state action immunity through
what can be interpreted as either an unduly cramped notion of the value and
purposes of the state action doctrine or a policy-oriented belief that federal
competition policy is generally superior to the state regulatory schemes. This
section considers the broader ramifications of this interpretative posture
through a discussion of two circuit court cases some critics have singled out as
problematic.
The FTC Staff Report identified two cases as "illustrat[ing] the problem"
of lower courts treating "the presence of a general regulatory regime in an
industry" as the basis for "automatically ... find[ing] displacement of all
aspects of competition in that industry. ' 40 These cases, according to the staff
report, interpreted the clear articulation standard too broadly and resulted in an
approach that "both contravenes Supreme Court precedent and undermines the
purpose of the clear articulation standard. 4 1
One "problem" case, Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Casualty,
involved a statute regulating workers' compensation insurance rates.42 The
statute at issue "authorized joint rate filings but stipulated that the approved
rates were upper limits on permissible charges. 43 When insurers charged the
same rate, the rate approved by Maine's Superintendent of Insurance, their
actions were challenged as price-fixing.4 4 The district court found state action
immunity available to the defendants and the First Circuit affirmed.45
The First Circuit held that the legislation in question "must be construed
as implicitly condoning an agreement among insurers to charge the rates they
jointly propose" notwithstanding that individual insurers "may charge less than
the approved rate., 46 The court found that "the expectation clearly is that the
Superintendent's rates are the ones that generally will be appropriate for, and
thus used by, all insurers. 47 The court's conclusion reflected, among other
circumstances, the fact that a previous provision that had prohibited insurers
from "agreeing 'to adhere to or use a rate or rating plan"' had been repealed.4 8
The First Circuit relied heavily on Southern Motor Carriers'sclarity trade-off,
noting that requiring the statute to compel pricing at the maximum authorized
39See supra Part II (discussing Supreme Court's clear articulation requirement in
state

action immunity cases).
4°FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 34.
41
Id. at 2.
42985 F.2d 1138, 1146-47 (1st Cir. 1993).
43FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at
34.
44Sandy River, 985 F.2d at 1141.
45Id. at 1139.
46Id. at 1146.
471d.

48Id. (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2347(2) (1985) (repealed 1987)).
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rate as a prerequisite for antitrust immunity would "negatively affect[]
principles of federalism. ' 49 The critics really appear to be responding not to the
court's failure to assess legislative intent, but rather the court's willingness,
because of the value attached to federalism, to immunize behavior that the
statute does not explicitly compel.
The FTC Staff Report identified Earles v. State Board of Certified Public
Accountants50 as another "problem" case. 5' The plaintiff, Kenneth Don Earles,
was a licensed certified public accountant (CPA) in Louisiana. 52 Louisiana's
CPA Board filed a complaint against Earles alleging that his concurrent
practice as a CPA and as a securities broker violated the Board's rules
prohibiting the practice of "incompatible occupations" and the "receipt of
commissions.. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial 54court's ruling that the
Board members were entitled to state action immunity.
The Fifth Circuit found, notwithstanding the statute's permissive nature
and the absence of an express intent to displace competition, that the statute
constituted a "broad grant of authority [to the Board] which includes the power
to adopt rules that may have anticompetitive effects. 55 The statute was selfconsciously expansive and empowered the Louisiana CPA Board to "[a]dopt
and enforce all rules and regulations, bylaws, and rules of professional conduct
as the board may deem necessary and proper to regulate the practice of public
accounting in the state of Louisiana." 56 The court relied heavily on Southern
Motor Carriers'strade-off rationale, quoting its language that "[a]gencies are
created because they are able to deal with problems unforeseeable to, or
outside the competence of, the legislature. 57 The court applied the controlling
Supreme Court precedent to balance its need to assess "reasonable
foreseeability" without unduly impairing federalism. 58 While critics may claim
fidelity to Supreme Court precedent, it appears that their dissatisfaction with a

49

1d. at 1147.
50139 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir. 1998).
5
521FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note
Earles, 139 F.3d at 1034-35.
53
1d. at 1035.
54
55
56

3, at 34-35.

1d. at 1044.

1d. at 1043.
1d. at 1042 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 37:75(B)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1998)).
1d. at 1044 (quoting S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 64 (1985)). The Fifth Circuit also relied on Hallie's recognition that requiring a higher level
of articulation would reflect an "'unrealistic view of how legislatures work."' Id. at 1043
(quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43 (1985)). Along similar lines, it
also quoted Areeda & Hovenkamp's treatise: "'Unfortunately, state statutes seldom speak with
clarity on [the elements of the 'clear articulation' requirement], for the federal antitrust
consequences of state legislation--especially of state delegations to subordinate units-was
hardly significant in the legislators' minds.'" Id. at 1043 (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
57

HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
58
1d. at 1043-44.

212.3a (Supp. 1997)).
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lower court's reasonable interpretation of Supreme Court rulings also reflects
disagreement with the Supreme Court itself.
My purpose in discussing these cases is not to defend the specific
outcomes. Instead, it is to underscore the importance of recognizing that a cost
to federalism adheres in increasing the articulation requirements necessary to
qualify for immunity. Supreme Court precedent, including Southern Motor
Carriersand Hallie, mandates resolution of the clarity trade-off in a manner
that is relatively favorable to state action. Taking the Supreme Court cases as
our touchstone, these appellate decisions do not seem to be manifestly
incorrect.
B. Assessing Reform ProposalsBased on Trade-Offs
The consequences of the antitrust critics' general interpretative stance
regarding the overall social welfare trade-offs between federalism and
competition policy become most apparent in their proposed reforms. Most
proposals do not appear to reflect much concern, and certainly no sustained
concern, with the potential costs of increasing the burdens attendant to
acquiring immunity. This section briefly surveys two proposed reforms, one
advocated by the FTC in the course of litigation and one advocated by
Professor Bush.
Much of the FTC's reform efforts within this context have occurred
through either lawsuits or competition advocacy more broadly defined. Toward
that end, it is worth considering the case of FTC v. Hospital Board of Directors
of Lee County (Lee County).59 This case involved an allegedly anticompetitive
acquisition of a competition hospital that, despite an FTC challenge, was
allowed by the Eleventh Circuit on state action grounds because the Florida
legislature gave the hospital's Board the power to acquire other medical
facilities. 60 The FTC Staff Report presented this case as "highlight[ing] th[e]
concern" that judicial "consideration of state competition policies" was not as
meaningful in practice as it was in principle.6' The FTC Staff Report asserted
"[a]lthough the court nominally recognized that clear articulation requires not
just authorization of the challenged activity but also a state policy authorizing
anticompetitive conduct, its actual analysis conflated the inquiries ... [N]o
true inquiry into intention to displace competition was made. 62 The FTC Staff
Report further stated, "[a]ssigning a probability to the events is... the key to
deciding whether the 'foreseeability' defense is properly available. 63 This
statement, while beguiling, is inapposite. The issue is not whether to assess

F.3d 1184 (11 th Cir. 1994).
'Id. at 1192.
61
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 32.
621d. at 32-33 (citation omitted).
538

63

1d. at 34.
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probabilities but rather the degree of probability required to qualify as
foreseeable.
In fact, crucial to Lee County was the court's rejection of the FTC's
proposed standard of foreseeability. The FIC argued, "a foreseeable
anticompetitive effect is one that ordinarily occurs, routinely occurs, or is
inherently likely to occur as a result of the empowering legislation." 64 The
court rejected the FTC's position and held that:
By attempting to impose a narrow definition on the term
"foreseeable," the Commission essentially seeks a bright line test
which turns the test of foreseeability into a test of inevitability,
falling just short of requiring the state to expressly indicate its
intention to displace competition ....
has ever been
...No such bright line definition or condition
65

embraced by the Supreme Court or by this Circuit.

A priority for the Eleventh Circuit in Lee County was ensuring adequate
protection of the "concepts of federalism and state sovereignty, ' ' 66 concepts the
court deemed particularly salient given that "the Florida Legislature implicitly
gave the Board the power to acquire other hospitals in an effort to provide lowcost healthcare primarily to indigent citizens of Lee County., 67 The nature of
the court's inquiry was also influenced by Hallie's caution "against overly
intrusive investigations into legislative intent. ' '68 The court clearly deemed the
FTC's proposed standard to be a substantial revision of Supreme Court
precedent rather than the uncontroversial interpretation the FIC claimed.
Whether or not in light of precedent regarding the clarity trade-off the Eleventh
Circuit fairly interpreted the FTC's proposed standard, the normative question
whether to revisit the economic efficiency trade-off remains.
More broadly, critics often link their proposed state action immunity
reforms to the changing nature of regulated industries. In essence, that change
reflects the fact that the government typically controls far fewer aspects of
"regulated" industries today than was the case in the past. As Professor Darren
Bush observed, "'[r]egulated' industries today are typically regulated only in
the parameters under which competition takes place. 69 While changes in the
nature and extent of government regulation of industry are clearly substantial
developments, the practical consequences of those changes are less clear.
On their face, such changes in regulatory climate help explain the
renewed interest in this area of law. Critics argue that the lower courts have not
64

Lee County, 38 F.3d at 1188.
at 1190-91.
1d. at 1191.

65
1d.
66
671d.
68

1d.

69

Bush, supra note 3,at 762 (citation omitted).
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applied the clear articulation standard in a sufficiently discerning manner. As a
result, immunity is conferred within contexts where the legislatures have not
sufficiently signaled their intent to displace competition.
If the state governments rely increasingly on hybrid regulatory schemes
(in the sense that only portions of a given industry are regulated or are
regulated more sparingly), the need for a judiciary that can make more subtle
evaluations of state pronouncements is greater. The critics seem to argue that
the courts do not apply the current state action tests in a way that adequately
adjusts to this new regulatory climate. However, the evidence for this
proposition is as yet somewhat thin and it is unclear whether there is any
inherent reason why the courts could not make such adjustments if, in fact,
they are warranted. Moreover, Professor Hovenkamp observed, "it is not clear.
. that antitrust tribunals need to respond in any programmatic way to changes
in regulatory attitude.
Repairing imperfections in political processes is not
70
antitrust's purpose.'
These arguments notwithstanding, if the changes in the regulatory climate
warrant some response, what should be done? Professor Darren Bush authored
a provocative proposal calling for identification of competition as the "default
rule in any industry.' If particular areas of the economy, while still regulated
by the state, are less heavily regulated than previously, then would that not
argue in favor of a more tailored view of what constitutes the relevant industry
rather than changing the underlying balance? More importantly, even if one
accepts that society should or does put qualitatively more weight on
competition than it had in the past, it would be a logical leap of faith to go
from accepting that-as a qualitative matter-the courts should accord greater
weight to competition than to the more extreme position that competition
should be the default.
As a corollary to competition as the default assumption, Bush advocates
that when conflict arises between the default rule and state legislative
initiative, the cost should be placed on the state legislatures because they are
the "least cost avoider., 72 Bush's application of a "least cost avoider" ("LCA")
rule as a metric by which to evaluate state action immunity claims crystallizes
key value judgments that many critics of state action immunity ostensibly
share but do not articulate.73 If, however, increasing the clarity of articulation
required imposes a cost on the state, and if that cost is substantial or even nontrivial, then the value of realigning this burden is debatable. Again, meaningful
consideration of the LCA rule, or any other reform, requires discussion of the
underlying trade-offs between federalism and competition. In addition, because
this particular argument is explicitly framed in terms of "least cost avoider," it
70
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is reasonable to expect its advocates to identify the different costs if not assign
them relative values.
Southern Motor Carriers and other Supreme Court cases highlight the
problems-costs-that states would incur if the clear articulation threshold
necessary for immunity were increased. The judiciary's concern reflects the
well-known difficulties involved in the legislative process. Imposing additional
requirements on legislators would likely alter the content of, and possibly the
likelihood of enacting, legislation. Thus, the cost of imposing the LCA rule
depends on the extent legislation is negatively altered or not enacted at all.
Admittedly, discerning the extent of these costs is a tough empirical question.
Nonetheless, society cannot meaningfully assess either the proposed reforms or
the status quo without greater insight into this issue. Similarly, it is worth
considering the relative cost to the states of revising legislation in response to
judicial missteps regarding immunity. More specifically, I have not foundnor does it appear that any critics have identified-instances in which a court
"erroneously" conferred immunity as reflected in subsequent legislative
reform.74 This certainly raises questions about whether the lower courts have
misinterpreted legislative intent as severely as many critics seem to suggest.
States have a range of regulatory and antitrust tools at their disposal with
which to address actual or perceived market failures. Although state regulatory
schemes that displace federal antitrust policy are frequently criticized as
motivated by parochial interests, reliance on such schemes may also merely
reflect different normative assessments for public policy questions that defy
easy resolution.75 Moreover, it is important to remember, as one court aptly
stated, that "the purpose and result of much political activity is to reduce
competition and to favor politically influential groups," and it is also true that
"regulation may serve private interests as well as the public interest. In politics,
76
a successful conspiracy is called a majority.,
74
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IV. CONCLUSION

A primary difference between the standard for state action immunity
doctrine in its current form and alternatives critics often propose lies in the
requisite showing of legislative intent to displace competition necessary to
confer immunity. Decades after the Supreme Court first articulated this
doctrine, but decades before the current debate, then-Chief Justice Burger
observed: "Our conceptions of the limits imposed by federalism are bound to
evolve ....

[As such], we should not treat the result in the Parkercase as cast

in bronze; rather, the scope of the Sherman Act's power should parallel the
developing concepts of American federalism., 7 7 In its most extreme, and
perhaps most candid, form, some critics have essentially proposed that when
ambiguity exists regarding legislative intent, the default position should be to
reject immunity. Such a position, even in its more attenuated forms, should be
recognized as a call to reconsider-whether at the jurisprudential level or by
Congress78-the underlying value of federalism. Once debated openly in this
manner, the antitrust community will have to content itself with the fact that
not all of the relevant considerations will necessarily fall within an economic
efficiency framework. Part of the obligation of the antitrust community in the
state action immunity debate then lies in illuminating the insights to be gleaned
from its unique trade-off analysis while not losing sight of the limitations to
that analysis.

regulations . . . is disconcerting as a matter of policy, the more important principle is that
flaws in political processes is not an antitrust task.").
correcting
77
City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 421 n.2 (Burger, C.J.,
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of government that should amend the antitrust laws to reach state activities or enact new federal
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